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COMMENTS
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS A DEFENSE TO THE
FIRING OF COURT EMPLOYEES BY JUDGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial immunity is a relatively recent doctrine that has grown
and expanded considerably since it was first articulated in Randall
v. Brigham' in 1868 and further developed in Bradley v. Fisher' in
1871. The main purpose behind the immunity principle is the pro-
tection of judges from lawsuits "when they have erred" 8 in their de-
© 1988 by Lisa Cournoyer Roberts
1. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). In this case, a justice of the Superior Court of Massa-
chusetts removed an attorney from the bar of that state. Plaintiff brought an action alleging
that the justice acted under unlawful authority. The court considered the general principle that
judicial officers are not liable in a civil action. Judges of limited or inferior authority were
protected only when they acted within their jurisdiction. However, there was no such limita-
tion with respect to judges of superior or general authority who were protected even when they
acted in excess of their jurisdiction.
2. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Bradley was the first case to clearly set out the tradi-
tional judicial immunity standard and to distinguish between a judicial act and a non-judicial
act. A judicial act warranted the protection of immunity and came to be defined, at that time,
as any act or decision made by a judge within his judicial authority. The issue arose following
a trial for the murder of Abraham Lincoln in which Bradley was the defense attorney. Fisher,
one of the justices on the court, directed that Bradley's name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys practicing in that court. The justice claimed that Bradley was rude and disrespectful
toward him in court. The United States Supreme Court found that the lower court had erred
in not first citing Bradley before striking his name. The Court conceded that though the lower
court's jurisdiction was erroneously exercised, it did not affect the validity of the act and,
therefore, did not make the act any less judicial nor subject Fisher to damages.
3. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 533 (1868). See also Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 348, (1871), which states that it is also well established that judges are
immune from liability for judicial acts even when they act "maliciously or corruptly." Id. The
rationale behind this doctrine is the need for judges to be free to make controversial decisions
and act upon their convictions without fear of personal liability. The Bradley Court stated
that, "[t]his provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty
to exercise their functions with independence, and without fear of consequences." Id. at 349-50
(quoting Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868)).
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cision-making. The doctrine introduced the notion that absolute im-
munity4 is essential to the independence of the judiciary and
consequently to the administration of justice5 in order to safeguard
principled and fearless decision-making.6
The majority of suits against judges are instigated by either ac-
tual litigants or individuals with a close identification or interest in
the business before the court.' In these actions, the defense of abso-
lute immunity is well-established and soundly justified. As Justice
White stated in Butz v. Economou:8
[Slafeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the
need for private damages actions as a means of controlling un-
constitutional conduct. The insulation of the judge from political
influence, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies,
the adversary nature of the process, and the correctability of er-
ror on appeal are just a few of the many checks on malicious
action by judges.'
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has
chipped away at the absolute privilege against liability held by
judges. The limitation came in the area of employment decision-
making in the case of Forrester v. White.1 The Court held that
judges are barred from asserting the defense of absolute immunity
against claims of discriminatory demotion or discharge.
Thus, the absolute immunity doctrine is only a safe haven for
judges when they are involved in case-related actions or other duties
performed that are arguably "judicial""1 in nature. Auxiliary duties,
such as employment decisions, are often characterized as ministerial
or administrative functions. Although employment decisions are au-
4. Absolute immunity means that the individual has a complete defense to a cause of
action against him. It does not depend on proper motives or whether he has acted maliciously,
corruptly, or arbitrarily. For the judiciary, it is also referred to as judicial immunity.
5. Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 536.
6. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
7. Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting). In
other words, these are people who deal with the judge in his judicial capacity in the courtroom.
As Judge Posner notes in his circuit court dissent in Forrester: "The business of a judge is to
rule against people. Every contested case has a loser, often a sore one. A significant fraction of
the losers would sue the judges if they could do so (some sue us despite our absolute immu-
nity)." d. at 661.
8. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
9. Id. at 512.
10. 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988).
11. A judicial act has been defined as follows: (1) an act normally performed by a judge
and to the expectations of the parties; and (2) a situation in which the parties deal with the
judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
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thorized duties of the judge, such decisions do not necessarily require
the discretion that is used in judicial decisions.
This comment addresses the roots of judicial immunity and
traces its development to the recent Forrester case." It discusses the
attributes of qualified immunity"8 and also examines cases in which
immunity was denied for judges when selecting or dismissing their
court personnel. When the United States Supreme Court denied
judges the defense of absolute immunity for such decisions in For-
rester, it left open the question of whether judges might still be pro-
tected by qualified immunity when making employment decisions. A
balancing approach is used to weigh the policy considerations that
surround the judicial immunity controversy and to find a feasible
alternative to the absolute immunity doctrine.
This comment focuses on the arguments and implications of the
qualified immunity doctrine as a defense to a judge's act of discharg-
ing court employees when his or her motives contravene the United
States Constitution or established law. Judge Posner's lengthy dis-
sent in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Forrester"' sets the stage for
the arguments establishing the use of qualified immunity when mak-
ing employment decisions. Ultimately, this comment determines that
qualified immunity is justified in the employment context. It also
advocates the extension of the qualified immunity defense to all acts
of a judge within his or her general administrative capacity, not ex-
clusively in employment situations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Roots of Judicial Immunity
Judicial immunity is solely a creature of common law, devel-
oped by judges from a pure liability doctrine.1 6 The first case to ad-
dress judicial immunity was Randall v. Brigham.16 The central
questions considered were whether the act performed was judicial
12. 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988).
13. Qualified immunity is only a partial defense. The individual's conduct must be
based on good faith to be protected from a cause of action. An act in knowing violation of the
law, conduct that is malicious, or conduct in reckless disregard of a statute is not protected by
qualified immunity.
14. 792 F.2d at 654.
15. Feinman & Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REv. 201 (1980).
Judges were not always immune from suit for their judicial acts. The doctrine of judicial
immunity developed only recently. For most of the history of the common law, judges have
been protected by very little or no immunity. Id.
16. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
19881
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
and whether the act was within the judge's jurisdiction.1" If the act
was not considered judicial, then there was no immunity or exemp-
tion by virtue of the judge's office, "for if he has acted without juris-
diction, he has ceased to be a judge." 18 However erroneous the act
may have been, and however injurious its consequences to the plain-
tiff, if the order is a judicial act within the court's jurisdiction, then
the judge may not be held to answer in civil damages. 9 Thus, at
times, the doctrine is harsh in individual cases because it leaves un-
redressed the wrongs committed by dishonest officers. However, in
order to protect judges from retaliation for their decisions in case-
related actions, some instances of injustice are unfortunately
inevitable."
Since Randall, absolute immunity has been extended to federal
hearings examiners and administrative law judges because their role
"is 'functionally comparable' to that of a judge."2 In addition, state
and federal prosecutors have full immunity when they are prosecut-
ing in the courtroom, 2 as do witnesses when testifying in a judicial
proceeding. 8 Grand jurors have been equally shielded from personal
liability.2 4 In addition, such court personnel as probation officers25
and court reporters2" have been granted derivative judicial immu-
nity27 based on their function within the judicial process.
Though many cases have developed and expanded the immunity
17. Id. at 531.
18. Id.
19. See supra note 3.
20. Stump, 435 U.S. at 363. A young woman sought to hold a circuit court judge liable
for her involuntary sterilization which he had approved at her mother's request when the
woman was fifteen years old. Her claim alleged various constitutional violations including the
violation of due process. The Supreme Court determined that the judge had jurisdiction over
the subject matter before him. The Court relied on the fact that there was no statute or case
law prohibiting the action taken by the judge. The Supreme Court held that only if a judicial
officer acted in a clear absence of jurisdiction or the act was not considered a "judicial act,"
then immunity would not protect him from the consequences of his actions.
21. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). "Judges have absolute immunity not
because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of
their responsibilities." Id. at 511.
22. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
23. Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1981), affid on other grounds, 460 U.S.
325 (1983).
24. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 478; Imbler, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Grand jurors are also
known as "quasi-judicial" officers.
25. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985).
26. Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971).
27. Derivative immunity is immunity that has been extended to certain others who per-
form functions closely associated with the judicial process. Immunity became necessary to pro-
tect those individuals who exposed themselves to the same liabilities that confronted judges.
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doctrine to quasi-judicial officers of the court, absolute immunity has
almost exclusively been confined to the activities of the judge within
the courtroom. Until Forrester,2" there was some ambiguity as to the
extent of immunity enjoyed by judges when performing duties char-
acterized as executive, legislative, or ministerial."9 Two factually
similar cases, decided within days of one another by the Seventh Cir-
cuit, illustrate the disparity that had previously existed in the case
law regarding the level of immunity for judges when making em-
ployment decisions.
B. Seventh Circuit Contradictory Cases
The two recent Seventh Circuit cases, Forrester0 and McMil-
lan v. Svetanoff,81 prompted the United States Supreme Court to
review whether the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity should be
applied to shield a judge from liability for damages caused by the
firing of court employees. The decisions, decided one week apart,
reached opposite conclusions.
The first case decided was Forrester. In Forrester, a discharged
probation officer brought a civil rights action against a state court
judge alleging sex discrimination.82 Under Illinois law, the judge in
question was found to have possessed the authority to hire and dis-
miss probation officers at his pleasure, seemingly without regard to
federal discrimination laws.
The court found that Forrester, in her capacity as a probation
officer, was dealing with the judge in a judicial capacity because she
28. 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988).
29. The following cases illustrate opinions which have found that employment decisions
are integral to the judge's performance of his duties and, therefore, qualify as a judicial act
warranting absolute immunity. Blackwell v. Cook, 570 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (dis-
missal of a probation officer was a judicial act protected by immunity for an employment
decision); Pruitt v. Kimbrough, 536 F. Supp. 764 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (the importance of inde-
pendence was essential; therefore, the judge was protected by immunity), affid mem., 705 F.2d
462 (7th Cir. 1983). See also other cases that have reached the opposite conclusion and found
that such employment decisions are merely administrative or ministerial acts: Shore v. How-
ard, 414 F. Supp. 379 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (the act was one that did not have to be performed by
a judge; therefore, it was ministerial and there was no immunity for the judge); Marafino v.
St. Louis County Circuit, 537 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (staff attorney was not immedi-
ate advisor to judge, and was therefore not protected by judicial immunity), affd on other
grounds, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983); Lewis v. Blackburn, 555 F. Supp. 713, 723
(W.D.N.C. 1983) (not a judicial act to decide not to reappoint a magistrate), aff'd, 734 F.2d
1000 (4th Cir. 1984), different results on reh'g en banc, 759 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985).
30. 792 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1282 (1987).
31. 793 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 574 (1986).
32. 792 F.2d 647 at 650.
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was rendering advice and recommendations to him for the disposition
of cases directly affecting the judge's discretionary judgment. Because
the relationship is founded on trust and confidentiality, the court
feared that a judge could not render just judgments without the aid
of a trustworthy probation officer unless protected by absolute im-
munity."3 In addition, the judge would be more hesitant to discharge
a probation officer for cause because of the threat of litigation. This
would have a detrimental effect on the public.84
The Forrester court focused primarily on the relationship be-
tween the judge and the probation officer, rather than the act of the
judge in making an employment decision.85 However, just five days
later in McMillan, 6 the court again emphasized the judge-employee
relationship and how it could impact the court.3 7 There, however,
the court reached the opposite conclusion.
In McMillan, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, while fol-
lowing the reasoning in Forrester, denied the judge's defense of judi-
cial immunity for the dismissal of a court reporter based on the re-
porter's race and political affiliation. The court determined that the
firing of an employee involved a decision of a personal nature rather
than an impartial nature. The judge was not called upon to utilize
his education, training, or experience in the law to make the employ-
ment decision. Furthermore, the court found that the need to protect
the constitutional rights of public employees overrides the need to
shield judges from personal liability in hiring and firing decisions.
The court noted that absolute "immunity should not be ex-
tended lightly or merely because the actor is a judge."3.8 Immunity
can only be justified by the special nature of an official's responsibili-
33. Id. at 657.
34. Id. at 658.
35. Id. at 656-58.
36. 793 F.2d 149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 574 (1986).
37. The court recognized that the judge's act must be characterized in relation to the
overall scheme of the judicial process. The court attempted to distinguish the act of making an
employment decision from the judge's other duties. This comment argues that there should be
a uniform standard to characterize the acts as either judicial or ministerial and grant absolute
immunity to the former and qualified immunity to the latter.
38. Id. at 154. The court further acknowledged a statement made by the Supreme Court
in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), in which a judge was charged with failing to select
black citizens of the county as jurors even though they possessed all the qualifications pre-
scribed by law:
Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined by its
character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge
or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting jurors might as well have been
committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge.
Id. at 348.
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ties that expose him to constant liability, not by his position within
the government. 9 The act of an administrative or ministerial officer
does not become judicial simply because it was performed by a judge
or because it involves some discretionary judgment.4 When the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Forrester,41 it
overruled the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Forrester and its
decision was consistent with the other Seventh Circuit case-McMil-
lan. The damage suit was brought under title 42, section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act.42 Absolute immunity was held to be unavailable in
protecting a judge from liability for his decision to demote and dis-
miss a court employee. The Court acknowledged the fact that the
threat of personal liability can inhibit government officials in the
proper performance of their duties, but indicated that the threat of
liability might also have the salutary effect of encouraging officials to
perform their duties in a lawful and appropriate manner.43  The
Court based its decision on the "functional analysis""' approach de-
veloped in Butz v. Economou.45 The Court stated that "immunity is
justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by
the person to whom it attaches.""
As noted earlier, until the United States Supreme Court spoke
on the issue of judicial immunity for employment decisions, there
was confusion in the law as to whether absolute immunity should
39. Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1982).
40. Wilson, Judicial Immunity: To Be or Not to Be, 25 How. L.J. 809, 818 (1982).
41. 108 S. Ct. at 538.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, or District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
43. Forrester, 108 S. Ct. at 540.
44. The "functional analysis" approach outlined in Butz focused the application of judi-
cial immunity on only acts of a judicial nature. This case involved federal executive officials
and their general qualified immunity status. Traditionally, the executive branch has only been
entitled to qualified immunity. However, Butz acknowledged that absolute immunity was not
necessarily confined to acts performed by the judiciary; therefore, it was possible for a member
of the executive branch to be protected by absolute immunity. The Court stated that it was not
the judge who compelled immunity but rather the special duties conferred upon him that re-
quired immunity. Therefore, all public officers or advocates, whether members of the execu-
tive, legislative or judicial branch, who are intimately associated with the judicial process and
are subject to the same restraints of the adjudicatory function, are protected by absolute immu-
nity. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508.
45. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
46. Forrester, 108 S. Ct. at 544.
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apply. Now that absolute immunity has been formally rejected, cases
following the no immunity principle will be examined to see if this is
the appropriate doctrine to be adopted by the Court. These cases
demonstrate that the Court should consider the qualified immunity
doctrine.
C. The No Immunity Principle
Judges without immunity will be personally liable to pay dam-
ages in a civil action for firing an employee in violation of the em-
ployee's constitutional rights. Currently, case law has not allowed a
plaintiff to recover compensatory damages from a judge when acting
within his authority. It was not until recently that judges lost their
protection from injunctive or declaratory relief.' It has been clearly
established that "[a]lthough injunctive relief against a judge rarely is
awarded ...judicial immunity does not bar such relief."' 8 Judge
Posner stated in his dissent in the Seventh Circuit decision of For-
rester that, "[a] probation officer fired on grounds of race or sex has
no right to appeal but does have administrative and judicial causes of
action against the employing agency (i.e., the court rather than the
judge)."' 9 He went on to say that the remedy is limited to equitable
relief of reinstatement with back pay only.50
Judicial exposure to injunctive and declaratory relief under sec-
tion 1983 was first addressed in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Con-
sumers Union.5" The Court in Consumers Union found judges im-
mune from equitable claims against them in their decision-making
capacity, but not in their enforcement capacity."' The Virginia Su-
preme Court had the inherent and statutory authority to regulate
and discipline the attorneys practicing in the state. The plaintiff,
who was involved in compiling a legal services directory, sued be-
cause attorneys refused to give information for the directory for fear
of violating the state's Code of Professional Responsibility prohibit-
ing advertising. The plaintiff claimed the Code violated his constitu-
47. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); see also
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
48. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 528.
49. Forrester, 792 F.2d at 662.
50. Id.
51. 446 U.S. 719 (1980). Originally, when the Court was confronted with 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and judicial immunity, it believed that the Legislature did not intend to abolish judicial
immunity by enacting § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The Pierson Court stated
that "[tihe legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale
all common-law immunities" in enacting § 1983. Id. at 554.
52. 446 U.S. at 734.
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tional right to gather, publish, and receive factual information re-
garding legal services. Because the Virginia Supreme Court was
acting in its legislative capacity in promulgating the Code, it was
immune from liability." However, based on its enforcement capac-
ity, it was liable and could be enjoined from enforcing the Code.4
The controversial case of Pulliam v. Allen" further extended
liability for injunctive relief when a judge was involved in judicial
misconduct. In Pulliam, the Court sustained the claim for injunctive
relief based on section 1983 and also granted attorney's fees against
the magistrate involved. Pulliam was said to be acting in his judicial
capacity when he incarcerated individuals unable to post bond for
misdemeanor offenses not involving jail time."' Since the Court up-
held the denial of judicial immunity for injunctive relief, the Court
further stated that the section 1988 attorney's fees provision is
proper when such relief is awarded under section 1983."'
The Pulliam decision does indicate that the Court is willing to
expose judges to monetary damages. Although attorney's fees are
usually not as large as compensatory damages, they can still be sub-
stantial. The Court stated that: "We never have had a rule of abso-
lute judicial immunity from prospective relief, and there is no evi-
dence that the absence of that immunity has had a chilling effect on
judicial independence."" The Court indicated that this type of rem-
edy is available when it is "necessary to prevent irreparable injury to
a petitioner's constitutional rights. . . ."" The loss of immunity for
injunctive or declaratory relief is some indication of the weakening of
the judicial immunity doctrine.
All the cases that have denied judges immunity for employment
decisions have found that those decisions are merely administrative
or ministerial acts rather than judicial acts. Based on that reasoning,
53. Id.
54. Id. at 736.
55. 466 U.S. at 522.
56. Id. at 525.
57. Id. at 544.
58. Id. at 536.
59. Id. at 537.
For the most part, injunctive relief against a judge raises concerns different from
those addressed by the protection of judges from damages awards. The limita-
tions already imposed by the requirements for obtaining equitable relief against
any defendant-showing of an inadequate remedy at law and of a serious risk
of irreparable harm ...severely curtail the risk that judges will be harassed
and their independence compromised by the threat of having to defend them-
selves against suits by disgruntled litigants.
Id. at 537-38.
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the courts determined that no immunity was available for the judges'
acts in the former. Just as there were many cases denying immunity
for personnel decisions, many cases granted immunity in the same
types of decisions. In the latter cases, they were labeled judicial acts.
There was no obvious difference in the reasoning employed by the
various courts in making the judicial versus ministerial distinction.6"
The cases had remarkably similar fact patterns and circumstances.
The policies and justifications cited by the courts illustrated that
their concerns were basically the same in all the cases. They bal-
anced the need to protect judges from frivolous lawsuits against the
need for plaintiffs to have a proper redress for their grievances. The
courts denying immunity considered the availability of an adequate
remedy as paramount.
D. The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is distinguished from absolute immunity by
the fact that absolute immunity "defeats a suit at the outset, so long
as the official's actions were within the scope of the immunity." 1 To
be within the scope of the immunity, the official must have signifi-
cant discretion that requires protection from retaliation for his deci-
sions that would otherwise undermine his duties. Based on the func-
tional analysis approach developed in Butz,"' the Court has come to
recognize qualified immunity as an appropriate alternative to the
doctrine of absolute immunity when judges perform ministerial
acts.63
The need to "qualify" the immunity arose in an action against
the Governor of Ohio who, while acting as head of the state militia,
was responsible for the death of four college students at Kent State
University in Scheuer v. Rhodes." Unlike absolute immunity, quali-
fied immunity protects officials only from liability for their actions,
not from exposure to lawsuits. The Scheuer Court stated:
[Q]ualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the
action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence
60. See supra note 29.
61. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419 n.13 (1976); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982).
62. 438 U.S. at 512; see also supra note 40.
63. Id. at 478.
64. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief,
that affords a basis for qualified immunity .... 65
Qualified immunity was originally construed as having an ob-
jective and subjective standard in Wood v. Strickland." The Court
noted that "[tihe official himself must be acting sincerely and with a
belief that he is doing right, but an act violating . . . constitutional
rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled,
indisputable law . . . than by the presence of actual malice."" The
Wood Court stated that the subjective element requires the denial of
immunity to an official if he knew or should have known that his
actions violated the Constitution or if his actions were motivated by a
malicious intent to deprive the individual of his or her constitutional
rights. In terms of the objective test, damages would only be appro-
•priate if the official acted in disregard of a clearly established consti-
tutional right. Only the latter standard has survived.
Since Harlow v. Fitzgerald,8 qualified immunity has become
more objective. The Court eliminated the subjective elements of the
doctrine and stated, instead, that "government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."" By eliminating the subjective element, the
Court held that the plaintiff could not defeat a qualified immunity
defense by bare allegations of malice. "[T]he Court [also] intended to
further the goals of judicial economy and avoid meritless litigation
against federal officials since questions of subjective intent are inher-
ently questions of fact and thus can rarely be decided by summary
judgment. 70
65. Id. at 247-48.
66. 420 U.S. 308, reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
67. Id. at 321.
68. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In this case, the Court considered the question of whether
presidential aides are entitled to a blanket protection of absolute immunity as an incident of
their offices. The Court found that the importance of loyal and efficient subordinates to the
President was insufficient to justify absolute immunity. Therefore, relying on Butz, the Court
held that presidential aides are generally entitled only to qualified immunity. Id. at 809.
69. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
70. Note, In Light of Harlow? National Black Police Assoc. v. Velde: The Doctrine of
Qualified Immunity in Modern Bivens Litigation, 8 GEORGE MASON U.L. REV. 435, 436
(1986). The problem with having a subjective element in the test is that it requires the court to
analyze the judge's state of mind which defeats the immunity's essential purpose-avoidance of
litigation. Also, the Court in Harlow stated that: "Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation
therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including
1988]
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Thus, the Harlow decision is recognized as the right not to
stand trial and face the burdens of litigation under certain circum-
stances. However, the entitlement is conditioned upon whether the
conduct of the judge violated clearly established law. The two-part
analysis stated in Wade v. Hegner71 must be applied: "Does the al-
leged conduct set out a constitutional violation? and ...Were the
constitutional standards clearly established at the time in ques-
tion? 17 2 The Harlow Court held that "[i]f the law at the time was
not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected
to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be
said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified
as unlawful. 73 If these allegations cannot be proven, the case is dis-
missed prior to discovery. If the plaintiff gets over that hurdle, the
defendant judge is still entitled to a summary judgment if discovery
fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to
whether the defendant committed the acts of which the plaintiff
complains. 4
Thus, the standard to be met under qualified immunity is good
faith knowledge as to the current state of the law. Once confronted
by a claim alleging a breach of the duty of good faith, the defendant
asserts the qualified immunity affirmative defense. At this point, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut.75 The plaintiff must establish
that the defendant judge intentionally denied or recklessly disre-
garded a federally protected right.7 In essence, the plaintiff must
show that at the time the judge acted, he or she violated clearly es-
tablished law of which a reasonable person would have had
knowledge.
McDonald v. Krajewski77 is a recent case which rejected abso-
lute and qualified immunity as a defense to the firing of a clerk-
secretary. The court applied the two-step approach delineated in
Wade and determined that the plaintiff successfully met the initial
an official's professional colleagues. Inquiry of this kind can be particularly disruptive of effec-
tive government." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
71. 804 F.2d 67, 70 (7th Cir. 1986).
72. Id. at 70. Discovery is not allowed until these threshold inquiries are resolved.
73. 457 U.S. at 818.
74. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
75. Soldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012
(1983).
76. "Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability
for civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights." Id. at 1163-64 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
77. 649 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
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burden by establishing a prima facie case of a constitutional viola-
tion. The second step was also satisfied because the judge's dismissal
was found to be in direct violation of clearly established law.
On the other hand, in Atcherson v. Siebenmann7 8 the judge was
granted qualified immunity because he did not know that his actions
violated the plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. 9 The
state of the law was unsettled as to whether an employer could dis-
miss an employee based upon accusations of misconduct against co-
employees, if it was likely to cause serious disharmony. The judge
relied upon statements made by a senior subordinate without con-
ducting his own investigation. Though the subordinate proved to be
unreliable, the court held the judge only to the standard of "reasona-
bleness in light of the circumstances." 80 The judgment was vacated
to the extent that it required the judge to pay damages and attorney's
fees.
III. ANALYSIS
To determine whether a judge is entitled to qualified immu-
nity81 or whether he should receive no immunity in the case of per-
sonnel decisions, we must look to the public policy concerns which
support judicial immunity for judges. Though the policy reasons fre-
quently raised are in response to the judge's special role in the court-
room, some are equally applicable to employment and other ministe-
rial situations.
A. Policy-Balancing Approach
Various policy reasons have been advanced in support of the
traditional absolute immunity doctrine. The rationales most often
cited are: the need to protect the public's interest in the free and
independent exercise of judicial discretion; the need to preserve the
dignity and respect of the judicial system as a whole; and the diffi-
culty in attracting persons of the highest character and ability to ju-
dicial positions without judicial immunity.82 These considerations,
although worthy of protection, are only justifiable when other reme-
78. 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979).
79. The decision came down before Harlow. Therefore, it contains the subjective prong
of the qualified immunity test. However, that was not relevant to the outcome of the decision
because the court deemed that element satisfied. Id. at 1065.
80. Id. at 1063.
81. See supra note 13 for a definition of qualified immunity.
82. Forrester, 792 F.2d at 647.
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dies are available to vindicate individual rights. As the United States
Supreme Court noted in Forrester, "[miost judicial mistakes or
wrongs are open to correction through ordinary mechanisms of re-
view,8" which are largely free of the harmful side-effects inevitably
associated with exposing judges to personal liability." '84
Each major opinion that has developed the traditional immunity
doctrine has attempted to balance carefully the policy concerns justi-
fying judicial immunity against the interests of the public in proper
redress. However, difficulties arise in fulfilling these policy objectives
when court personnel are unjustly discharged. Historically, the
rights of the individual have been sacrificed for the greater good of
the system.8 This sacrifice has been condoned because alternative
remedies for the litigant existed.8" However, this concept breaks
down in an employment discrimination situation because there are
no adequate alternative remedies. Whereas victims of a wrongful
ruling have a remedy in a higher court, victims of unconstitutional
firing have no right to appeal after dismissal.87 They only have an
equitable remedy against the court, not the judge.88 They are not
eligible for monetary compensation, although damages have been
sanctioned for the invasion of a personal liberty interest.8"
The first policy reason asserted in support of judicial immunity
83. 108 S. Ct. at 544. It is contended that the "judicial process is self-correcting: proce-
dural rules, appeals, and possibility of collateral challenges obviate the need for damages action
to prevent unjust results." See generally Briscoe, 663 F.2d at 713. However, this is not true in
discriminatory employment situations. Probation officers, court reporters, and other related
court personnel do not have the same protections afforded to a litigant. Whereas a litigant who
has been denied due process in an adversarial proceeding may appeal the case to a higher court
for review, an at-will court employee who questions the motives of a judge's employment deci-
sion, due to the absence of adequate procedural safeguards, must file a civil rights suit. McMil-
lan, 793 F.2d at 155.
84. Id. at 544. One major argument against full judicial immunity in the employment
area is that there is a serious lack of accountability. Judges who are malicious, corrupt, or
arbitrary in their employment practices may not necessarily be subject to the usual remedies
such as suspension, impeachment, or removal from office. See Note, Judicial Immunity and
Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal for Limited Liability, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 549, 578 (1978).
85. Note, Stump v. Sparkman: Judicial Immunity or Imperial Judiciary, 47 UMKC L.
REV. 81, 92 (1978). In order to maintain the independence of the judiciary and protect judges
from civil suits against them, the immunity doctrine forecloses a damages remedy to those
litigants who have a grievance against a judge.
86. Normally, an individual faced with an adverse judgment has the opportunity for
appellate review. There also exist safeguards such as procedural rules, collateral challenges as
well as safeguards that are inherent in the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
87. Forrester, 792 F.2d at 662.
88. Id. The fired employee has no right to appeal and is limited to reinstatement with
back pay, but common law damages for discriminatory dismissal is not allowed.
89. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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focuses on the public's interest in an independent judiciary. The
courts are perceived as being non-political and free from governmen-
tal influences. The judicial system is based on fairness and impartial-
ity-ideals upon which the public relies. However, the judiciary
should not be so independent in every respect that judges are above
the law. As one author notes, "[j]udges, endowed with great power
and subject to very little control, occupy an unusual place in society.
Federal judges are appointed for life or good behavior and are very
seldom impeached . . .[S]ome limitations must exist to control abso-
lute power .. "90 Qualified immunity could be an appropriate
limitation when judges are performing ministerial duties. This com-
promise does not entirely exempt them from liability, but it does af-
ford judges some of the needed protections.9 '
The second public policy concern behind the immunity doctrine
is the preservation of the dignity and respect of the judiciary. Judges
must not be constantly confronted with groundless suits, and their
discretion must not be questioned by every disgruntled litigant.
However, to maintain that dignity, judges must earn the public's re-
spect and confidence by faithful execution of unbiased decisions in all
phases of their duties, including employment decisions. Exposure to
unfounded suits from losing parties in litigation is far more worthy
of absolute immunity protection than actions as a result of employ-
ment discrimination.9" However, liability to answer to every ag-
grieved litigant would be inconsistent with an independent judiciary.
Thus, the use of a qualified immunity defense could help to recog-
nize and to guard against insubstantial lawsuits, enabling a quick
disposition of the claim so that "federal officials are not harassed by
frivolous lawsuits"" or expensive pretrial discovery.
The third major policy advanced in support of judicial immu-
nity is the strong interest in maintaining integrity in the judiciary,
ensuring that judges are free to exercise their judicial functions with-
out fear of personal consequences. Responsible people in judicial po-
sitions are unlikely to be willing to risk their time and financial re-
sources defending lawsuits against litigants offended by adverse
90. See Note, Judicial Immunity, supra note 84, at 585.
91. See Forrester, 792 F.2d at 660.
92. See Way, A Call for Limits to Judicial Immunity: Must Judges Be Kings in Their
Courts?, 64 JUDICATURE 390, 392 (1981). Way constructed a chart derived from the Eighth
Decennial Digest (West 1979) that plotted the "Origins of suits and actions against judges,
1966-1978." A total of 163 lawsuits were filed and published-118 federal cases and forty-five
state cases. Only nineteen of the total of 163 were filed against judges in their administrative/
ministerial role.
93. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 508).
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decisions or disgruntled former employees."' However, there are peo-
ple with less immunity who serve in positions that are subject to
broader liability.9" The majority of the officers and employees within
the executive branch as well as those in powerful positions in private
industry are shielded only by qualified immunity.
The fourth policy reason in favor of judicial immunity is the
prevention of distractions caused by the threat of civil actions against
judges. Such a threat could have an inhibiting effect on their work
by diverting their attention from the business of the court." If judges
were required to dedicate a great deal of time to the documentation
of personnel problems in case their actions were later challenged,
this would pose a serious danger of creating an even greater backlog
in the court system. 97
Lastly, there is the fear that it would be unfair to impose liabil-
ity on a judicial officer for actions taken in good faith. To penalize a
judge for an honest judicial error when the judge is acting within the
scope of his authority would only serve to intimidate him and make
him more hesitant to act. The integrity of the judicial system, which
consists of staff selected primarily by judges, depends upon both the
existence of a remedy for discriminatory employment practices and
protection for the judges.
There is a strong public interest in and need for the protection
of judges since they are required by the obligations of their positions
to make discretionary decisions. To maintain high judicial standards
of conduct, to reduce the threat of liability, and to preserve the inde-
94. See Note, Judicial Immunity, supra note 84, at 583. The threat of suit is likely to
make qualified people unwilling to serve as judges. Taxpayers will not be able to raise judicial
salaries high enough for judges to accept the risk of litigation initiated by a party to an action
before the court who loses and wants to blame the presiding judge.
95. Way, supra note 92, at 396. "[Executive officers'] discretion may be less predictable
and arguably more hazardous than judicial discretion." Judges work in a more certain
environment.
96. See Forrester, 792 F.2d at 660.
97. See Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 349.
If upon such allegations a judge could be compelled to answer in a civil action
for his judicial acts, . . . he would be subjected for his protection to the neces-
sity of preserving a complete record of all the evidence produced before him in
every litigated case, and of the authorities cited and arguments presented, in
order that he might be able to show to the judge before whom he might be
summoned . . . that he had decided as he did with judicial integrity; and the
second judge would be subjected to a similar burden. . ..
Id. Originally, the argument was asserted to justify absolute immunity for judicial acts. How-
ever, it is still a viable argument to support qualified immunity over no immunity at all.
Judges may still need to use wasteful and distracting devices to guard against possible future
liability.
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pendence and respect of the judiciary requires qualified judicial im-
munity. Employees legitimately injured by a judge's discriminatory
employment decision should be entitled to proper redress. A look at
other government officials and the protection they are afforded under
the same circumstances illustrates that judges are not significantly
different.
B. Comparison with Other Branches of Government
A comparison of legislative and executive immunity standards is
useful in establishing boundaries for judicial immunity in employ-
ment termination cases. The judiciary is very much like the executive
branch, and the judiciary should follow the same qualified immunity
standard used to protect executive officers.
1. The Legislative Branch
Legislative immunity is the only immunity mentioned in the
Constitution. All Congressional action, including employment deci-
sions, is constitutionally limited by the reach of the speech or debate
clause of the Constitution.9 The clause states, in part that:
Senators and Representatives, shall be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses,
and in going to and returning from the same, in all cases, except
treason, felony, and breach of peace; and for any speech or de-
bate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other
place. 9"
The purpose for this constitutional declaration is to protect the
members of Congress in conduct that is necessary to the performance
of their duties and to insure the independence of legislators.1 0 The
immunity applies to the speeches given by legislators when involved
in legislative matters such as debates and votes. However, legislators
can be civilly or criminally liable for political acts which are not
considered legislative activities.10 In addition, since legislators are
accountable to their constituents, they are subject to checks which
help prevent abuses of authority.
Employment appointments and terminations, hovever, often es-
cape political scrutiny. A clear distinction has not been made within
98. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
99. Id.
100. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972).
101. That distinction has not been clearly defined. Burke, Privilege & Immunity in
American Law, 31 S.D.L. REV. 1, 5 (1985).
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the legislative branch as to whether legislators have immunity to fire
employees in violation of the Constitution. The cases suggest that
absolute immunity might be more appropriate in the legislative
branch because of the politics involved and the special need for
loyalty.
In Davis v. Passman,10 2 a congressional staff member alleged
that she was terminated as a result of sexual discrimination in viola-
tion of the United States Constitution. The Court found that the
Congressman was not shielded by the speech and debate clause and
applied the principle that "legislators ought . . . generally to be
bound by (the law) as are ordinary persons."103
Another case, Browning v. Clerk,'" was decided differently.
Browning involved a former United States House of Representative
Official Reporter who alleged that her termination was motivated by
racial discrimination. Immunity was contingent on whether the ac-
tivity was "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes [of Congress]." °' The Court found that the employee di-
rectly assisted members of Congress, and therefore, the termination
was legislative in nature and protected by the clause. Even in the
legislative branch, immunity for employment decisions is uncertain.
For the most part, however, legislators, like prosecutors, only have
absolute immunity when they are actually legislating or prosecuting
respectively.
2. The Executive Branch
Executive immunity grew out of the common law much the
same as judicial immunity and has no textual, constitutional basis. It
would be inconsistent for executive officials to enjoy qualified immu-
nity from damages for executive misconduct while refusing judges
the same degree of protection for similar acts. 00
The President of the United States in Nixon v. Fitzgerald°7
was granted absolute immunity from damages for conduct arising
out of official acts which included personnel decisions. The Court
based its decision on the importance of the President's freedom to
choose loyal and trustworthy aides and subordinates in executing the
102. 442 U.S. 228 (1979) '
103. Id. at 246 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972)).
104. 789 F.2d 923 (7th Cir. 1986).
105. Id. at 928 (citations omitted).
106. Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1984).
107. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
[Vol. 28
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
duties of his office.' 08 Considerable deference is also given to matters
of national security and internal consultations and deliberations.'
However, absolute immunity is the exception rather than the rule.
Generally speaking, executive officers receive only qualified immu-
nity.11 It is acknowledged that there are exceptional circumstances
when absolute immunity is essential to the conduct of public
business."'
3. The Judiciary
Judicial immunity is also based on common law. There is no
explicit constitutional right to absolute immunity for the judiciary,
when compared with the Legislature. Judges are not significantly
different nor are their reasons distinguishable from members of the
executive branch which must comply with constitutional hiring and
firing procedures. Executive officials are liable for their knowingly
unconstitutional acts.' Since judges are sworn to uphold the Consti-
tution in trial proceedings, they should be held accountable outside
the courtroom. It would be inconsistent to apply a different standard
than that used for the executive branch since all swear to uphold the
Constitution of the United States in their oaths of office. Judge Pos-
ner claims that a judge is no more likely to be sued for employment
discrimination than other public or private employers.' 8 It can be
concluded, then, that for employment decisions, a judge need only be
protected by qualified immunity, as are executive officials, when per-
forming their official functions.
IV. PROPOSAL
As has been stated, the immunity doctrine was developed to ad-
dress decisions made by judges with regard to cases or controversies
in the courtroom. It was not designed to cover all duties performed
by a judge, nor should it. Judges are not acting in their judicial ca-
pacity when executing employment decisions. Judges do need some
level of immunity in order to perform their administrative duties ef-
fectively. Limited protection is appropriate in situations where a
108. Id. at 744-58.
109. Id. at 750.
110. Butz, 438 U.S. at 478.
111. Id. at 507. Traditionally, absolute immunity has been extended to executive officers
only when they are engaged in adjudicative functions.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 662-64.
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properly motivated judge would be reluctant to act for fear of a civil
damage action and when that reluctance would undermine the integ-
rity of the general process of judicial administration.114
There is a way to ease the tension between these two competing
interests. It is generally agreed that plaintiffs deserve some sort of
compensation for the violation of their constitutional rights by a judi-
cial officer, but the public also demands that judges be shielded from
civil liability. The theories and reasoning gleaned from the leading
cases have provided a basis for applying qualified immunity in an
employment situation. Qualified immunity for judges in their minis-
terial duties such as the hiring and firing of court personnel is the
best alternative to the now rejected absolute immunity doctrine. Ac-
cording to Mitchell v. Forsyth,'1 8 qualified immunity is "immunity
from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.""' There has al-
ready been some erosion of the doctrine in this area as evidenced by
the conflicting assortment of cases discussed earlier.117 As one com-
mentator suggests, 1 8 the changes in the doctrine are inevitable. He
advises that the judiciary take control of and guide future develop-
ment and limitations on the use of absolute immunity.
Limiting immunity for judges in their role as personnel admin-
istrators, while still allowing absolute immunity in their roles as ad-
judicators, seems to be a logical boundary for the judicial immunity
doctrine. As indicated above, the strong public policy reasons sup-
porting judicial immunity in the case or controversy situation are
still relevant when applied to a judge's employment decisions.
Judges, when making employment decisions, are similar to officials
in the two other branches of government and, therefore, should be
treated similarly.
There are four basic reasons that qualified immunity is pro-
posed in favor of no immunity at all. First, qualified immunity pro-
vides some protection from the exposure to liability that now faces
judges for their employment decisions. It avoids the unfair punish-
ment of judges for performing a duty that is authorized, and in some
instances required, by law. The Wood Court advocated good-faith
fulfillment of one's responsibilities:
Public officials . . . who fail to make decisions when they are
114. See Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
115. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
116. Id. at 526.
117. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
118. Roth & Hagan, Judicial Immunity Doctrine Today: Between the Bench and a
Hard Place, 35 Juv. & FAM. CTs. J. 3, 12 (1984).
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needed, or who do not act to implement decisions when they are
made do not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their of-
fices. Implicit in the idea that officials have some immu-
nity-absolute or qualified-for their acts, is a recognition that
they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes
on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible
injury from such error than not to decide or act at all.1 9
Second, much time and energy is required to defend a lawsuit,
whether it is valid or not. If judges are not provided any immunity,
the number of lawsuits is likely to increase dramatically. Judges will
be burdened by litigation concerning their ministerial decisions-a
burden likely to affect their adjudicative decision-making role as
well. Disruption of their courtroom functions is the primary reason
that judges were originally afforded judicial immunity. Qualified im-
munity would eliminate frivolous lawsuits from the start through
pre-trial procedures.1 20
Third, denying any measure of immunity would serve only to
intimidate judges to be hesitant in making decisions which are neces-
sary to the proper functioning of the court. As stated in Wood: "The
imposition of monetary costs for mistakes which were not unreasona-
ble in the light of all circumstances would undoubtedly deter even
the most conscientious budge] from exercising his judgment indepen-
dently, forcefully and in a manner best serving the long-term interest
of the [court]." ' But at the most basic level, the absence of immu-
nity is likely to deter qualified people from entering the judiciary
and aggressively serving the public's interest.
Finally, the public believes that judges hold an honored place in
society which demands that judges be shielded from liability. While
the public recognizes there is a need to hold judges accountable, this
is true only in the areas of gross misconduct. The dignity of the judi-
ciary is diminished when judges are forced to take the stand in their
own defense. At least qualified immunity will provide the judges
119. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321, reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975) (citing
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 241-42).
120. Butz, 438 U.S. at 507-08:
Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the
possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim
for relief . . . it should not survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court
recognized in Scheuer that damages suits concerning constitutional violations
need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion
for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. ...
Id.
121. 420 U.S. at 319-20.
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with an initial defense to a claim of a constitutional violation. A de-
termination must be made as to whether, at the time the action oc-
curred, the law was clearly established. If the law were well-settled
at the time, then qualified immunity will be defeated. Qualified im-
munity will also prove ineffective if there is an issue of material fact
which is disputed, thereby destroying a motion for summary judg-
ment. But, in the majority of cases the qualified immunity doctrine
will serve to provide judges with ample protection when they have
acted within the bounds of the law.
V. CONCLUSION
As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "[t]he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the
first duties of government is to afford that protection." '22 Court em-
ployees victimized by discrimination in the firing process now have
some redress against a judge as a result of the elimination of the
absolute judicial immunity barrier in discriminatory employment de-
cisions. It is unclear whether qualified immunity will be extended to
judges, or whether they will be without immunity. The United
States Supreme Court failed to decide this issue in Forrester v.
White. This deficiency should be remedied by allowing qualified im-
munity protection for a judge's employment decisions as well as for
other administrative acts. Then, if an employee alleges an unconsti-
tutional dismissal, he can challenge the judge's decision and receive
damages as a remedy if the decision is determined to be in violation
of the Constitution. Yet, the judge will still have qualified immunity
protection to shield him from frivolous and unfounded suits relating
to adjudicative acts.
Justifications asserted for the judiciary's special protection do
not persuasively distinguish the judicial function from the executive
and legislative functions. In employment decisions, judges should not
be denied the same level of immunity as those in comparable posi-
tions in the other branches of government. It is said that a judge who
acts on his own prejudices is not acting as a judge and has been
removed from the domain of judicial authority. The Court stated in
Butz that "it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or
should know he is acting outside the law, and . . . insisting on an
122. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not unduly
interfere with the exercise of official judgment."'' 3
Lisa Cournoyer Roberts
123. Butz, 438 U.S. at 506-07.
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